(the ingroup) compared with a closely related set of species (the outgroup). The characters should be informative, that is they should be able to differentiate between species. So characters that are only absent in the ingroup and present in the outgroup are not informative for the relationships between the ingroup species. Several independent cladograms can be used to construct phylogenetic trees, which give an indication of the way species have evolved. Characters and their states can also be plotted on existing phylogenetic trees to reveal their state changes. This is not similar to creating cladograms. In both cases characters and their respective states have to be defined beforehand.
The editors use the plotting technique but unfortunately they do not use this method to its fullest extent in their comparative approach. They combine the data on great apes to produce tables or statements of what is present or absent in these apes in captivity or the wild and discuss whether the trait (deception, self-recognition, etc.) is present or absent in their common ancestor. Implicitly they seem to assume that the trait is absent in the common ancestor of the great apes and lesser apes or the common ancestor of apes and Old World monkeys. Implicitly therefore their analysis often reduces these traits to characters with only two states: present (1) or absent (0). In their attempt to put gorillas and orangutans on the stage the editors have eliminated the possibility of differences between great ape species. They have not defined characters and the states thereof beforehand and sufficiently well to use a plotting technique. Their cladistic approach often leads to a set of noninformative characters for the ingroup under study, namely the great apes, since the character states do not give any information about possible differences between the species involved. The question arises whether more than one character state exists for the different characters. So, rather than suggesting that there is no difference between species, it would have been more interesting and appropriate to determine whether and how a character might differ between species.
Finally, the book contains a chapter by Semendeferi on the frontal lobes and cognitive processes of great apes with a focus on gorillas and orang-utans. Indeed, analysing the differences in the neural network that supports the cognitive capacities of apes is crucial for understanding the differences between species in terms of hardware. We have shown how the cladistic approach can be fruitfully applied to reveal such patterns in the neural organization underlying theory of mind in primates (van den Bos et al. 1998) .
In sum this book contains much valuable information on gorillas' and orang-utans' mental life but is not well organized from a comparative perspective.
RUUD VAN Around half of the 21 chapters describe the natural history of a species or group of species with particular attention to their social organization. Each author then discusses the likely opportunities for the animals to learn from their conspecifics, presenting field studies and anecdotes that may be highly suggestive of social learning but fall short of providing definitive evidence for it. The chapters by Lee & Moss on elephants and by Gilbert on bears exemplify this approach. The observations reported are the fruits of persistent and ingenious fieldwork, but the reader is nevertheless left with a sense of how much more needs to be done before we really understand social learning in that animal. Some chapters review both field observations and controlled experiments, and these contributions lead to a more fleshed-out picture. For example, Kitchener's chapter, on young learning from their mothers among the Felidae, integrates field observations of big cats with experimental work on domestic cats. Kitchener establishes that social learning is important in allowing young cats to identify appropriate prey species and to perfect their killing techniques.
A few chapters describe original, well-constructed experiments that really pin down an instance of social learning. Laland's chapter describes a series of transmission chain experiments using rats, and establishes that a novel foraging technique can be passed along a sequence of animals. Hudson, Schaal & Bilkó look at the ways in which young European rabbits learn food preferences from their mothers, and show that multiple mechanisms exist: transmission occurs in utero, through suckling, and via faecal pellets.
The first four chapters of the book are theoretical or position pieces, including Box's argument that individual differences in temperament will mean different opportunities for social learning, and a piece by Sibly applying some rudimentary cost-benefit results from signalling games to the social learning case. The editors are aware that humans, hominids and apes are mammals too, and the book covers these groups in the concluding four chapters. For example, Byrne discusses the ability of apes to imitate behavioural programmes, and Mithen makes the surprising claim that the archaeological record,
